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THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
A RETROSPECTIVE
Thomas E. Kauper*

In 1955, the third year of the Eisenhower administration, the
published what I believe to be the only sympo
sium on antitrust law ever to appear in its pages. 1 The occasion was the
release in March of that year of a Report of the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,2 a nearly four
hundred-page examination of virtually all facets of federal antitrust
doctrine and enforcement. The pages of the symposium led me of
course to revisit the Report itself, a visit a little like seeing an old high
school friend long forgotten some forty years later. For those of us
who were law students in the late 1950s, the Report was an old friend.
It was our antitrust hombook and many of us knew it well. With the
discovery of an old friend, conversation is likely to turn, after an initial
period of reminiscences, to how things have changed in the interval
since parting. How have we fared, and how are things now as com
pared to then? These are the same questions that arise in revisiting the
Report. How has it fared? What influence did it have? And how does
the antitrust world it describes compare with the antitrust world of to
day?
The Report was prepared by a committee of fifty-nine lawyers, law
professors and economists (the latter being a relatively small fraction
of the group). The Committee was co-chaired by the Assistant Attor
ney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Stanley N. Barnes
and Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim of the University of
Michigan Law Review

* Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1957,
J.D. 1960, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. The articles comprising the symposium are Kenneth S. Carlston, Basic Antitrust Con
cepts, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1955); John T. Chadwell, Antitrust Administration and En
forcement, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1133 (1955); Kendall B. DeBevoise, Antitrust Policy in Distri
bution, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1073 (1955); Bartholomew Diggins, The Patent-Antitrust Problem,
53 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (1955); Robert A. Nitschke, The Antitrust Laws in Foreign Com
merce, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1059 (1955); Russell A. Smith, Antitrust and Labor, 53 MICH. L.
REV. 1 119 (1955). My comments will not deal with patents nor with issues of antitrust ex
emptions.

2. REPORT OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAws (Mar. 31, 1955) [hereinafter REPORT] . The National Committee will
be referred to simply as "the Committee."
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Michigan Law School. Members of the Committee were appointed by
Attorney General Brownell, who in turn had reviewed the tentative
list of appointees with President Eisenhower. The Committee's charge
from the Attorney General was to undertake "a thoughtful and com
prehensive study of our antitrust laws."3 President Eisenhower ex
pected the Committee to "provide an important instrument to prepare
the way for modernizing and strengthening our laws to preserve
American free enterprise against monopoly and unfair competition. "4
Clearly this was a major undertaking, and expectations for the
Committee's report were high.
The Report's release came in the midst of the cold war and its re
sulting international tensions. It was also a time of American eco
nomic strength. American firms did not yet face strong competition
from European and Asian rivals, rivals whose strength would steadily
increase over the next three decades but who in 1955 were still in the
process of rebuilding following the ravages of World War II. Ameri
can firms were eager to sell and invest outside the United States.
Many national markets were effectively closed by tariffs, quotas, and
other protectionist barriers. The European Community was as yet un
born. Few countries other than the United States had antitrust laws
and enforcement in some of those who did was lax. Antitrust was
largely an American phenomenon, taken seriously here but not so se
riously abroad. Even in the United States, antitrust had had a some
what checkered history.5 But by 1955 there had been ten years of rela
tively steady and consistent enforcement. Private actions seeking
treble damages, relatively uncommon before World War II, were in
creasing, although far from the numbers of three and four decades
later. It was a propitious time to look at where American antitrust law
had been and where it was, and should be going. It was also a time far
different from today.
Today, terrorism has replaced the cold war. American firms face
more competitive markets at home and abroad. As a result of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT") and, more re
cently, the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), tariff and other gov3. REPORT, supra note 2, at iv.
4. Id.
5. A number of early cases brought by the Justice Department were against labor un
ions, not the major trusts. There followed a period of active enforcement, a period in which
cases against Standard Oil Co. and a number of other major trusts were initiated, and the
Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Acts were enacted. The period from World
War I to 1937 has been characterized as "the era of neglect," with few prosecutions during
the pro-business twenties and following the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, an act that permitted industry cooperation through use of the N.R.A. ("Blue Eagle")
codes, in the first Roosevelt administration. The more modern phase of active enforcement
can be said to have begun in 1937. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Anti
trust Movement, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS
188, 196-98 (1965).
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ernment boundary-related barriers have fallen and globalization is the
order of the day. The European Union now represents an integrated
market as large as, or larger than, the United States. In the antitrust
world, over eighty countries now have antitrust or competition policy
legislation, in many cases actively enforced and in some, like the
United States, applicable on an extraterritorial basis.6 Antitrust is now
international in scope. Enforcement officials today are concerned
about cooperation among themselves and whether some form of mul
tilateral agreements on antitrust matters is either necessary or desir
able. Antitrust in the 80s and 90s was an export, with the United States
and European authorities actively promoting the enactment of their
own version by other nations. In this new world, the Report may seem
quaint or so out of date as to be classified as antique or a no longer
relevant piece of history. Yet in some respects the Report seems as
current as if it were released today.
The Attorney General's Report had some influence, although not
as much as the Committee undoubtedly would have liked. A number
of its recommendations were followed in legislative enactments and
policy developments, although sometimes in circuitous ways. The
Report was relied upon by the Supreme Court as recently as 1990.7
Other recommendations and suggestions were ignored or, in some
cases, simply rejected. Today, the Report and the commentary on it
provide a benchmark against which nearly fifty years of antitrust de
velopment can be measured.
The Report was a remarkable exercise in consensus building.
While there are dissents from some of its recommendations, it reflects
unanimity throughout most of its eight chapters. The achievement of a
consensus in a committee of fifty-nine members obviously required
compromises, some of which are clear in the Report. It is also clear
that a readily identifiable group of members simply did not agree with
the general thrust of the Report, feeling that the Report overall would
unduly relax both antitrust doctrine and enforcement.8 These mem
bers and others felt that the decision of the Committee to provide a
detailed examination of case law in some areas and not to provide an
empirical analysis of the impact of antitrust on the economy fell short
of the kind of study contemplated when the Committee was commis6. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST: FINAL REPORT 1 (2000) [hereinafter ICPAC FINAL REPORT] ;
see also infra notes 121-122.
7. Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 559-63 (1990).
8. There were both signed dissents and other dissents that are simply noted. Five mem
bers - Walter Adams, John M. Clark, Alfred E. Kahn, Eugene V. Rostow and Louis B.
Schwartz - dissented from the Report as a whole. Professors Rostow and Schwartz also dis
sented from a number of specific parts of the Report. Walter Adams did likewise, although
less frequently. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 388-93.
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sioned. This is a fair criticism, although it is also true that such empiri
cal analyses have not been done since. Perhaps the task is too daunting
or simply not doable at all. American antitrust rests heavily on what in
the end is an act of faith, faith that markets work and are in large part
self-correcting. Antitrust rules have reflected more an exercise in
building a superstructure of logic upon a base of that faith. Seldom has
doctrine been built on empirical data. The Attorney General's Report
and the consensus it manifests therefore stand firmly in antitrust's tra
dition. Substantively, the Report analyzes existing case law in detail, a
far easier task than would be the case today because there were far
fewer cases to talk about. The discussion, particularly the discussion of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in chapter 1, is generally without
criticism. The focus is on what the law is, not what the law should be.
It is more hornbook than critique. Hence its appeal to law students at
examination time.
The structure of the Report itself says much about the antitrust of
1955. Distribution issues, including refusals to deal, tying, exclusive
dealing, resale price maintenance, and the Robinson-Patman Act,
comprise eighty pages. (The Robinson-Patman Act alone takes over
fifty pages). The discussion of horizontal relationships - price fixing,
territorial divisions, conscious parallelism, monopolization and at
tempt to monopolize - is done in less than sixty pages. In the chapter
on administration and enforcement, forty-five pages are devoted to
the Justice Department and FTC, while only eight deal with private
actions. Mergers merited their own chapter, fourteen pages in all. On
the other hand, and somewhat surprising perhaps to those who believe
problems of extraterritoriality and competitive problems of interna
tional trade are something that have come with globalization, nearly
fifty pages are given over to these subjects. Finally, the Report's next
to last chapter (preceding only the chapter on administration) is de
voted to economic analysis, particularly the concept of "workable
competition." All of this can simply be gleaned from the Table of
Contents.
The framework of the Report suggests a preoccupation with distri
bution issues and particularly with the Robinson-Patman Act. While
their numbers were increasing, treble damage actions had not yet
achieved the significance of later years.9 Mergers were not a major is
sue, although the Report recognized that they could become a major
matter in years ahead. In 1955, however, there had been virtually no
cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended in 1950. Foreign

9. In the period from 1941 through 1945, 297 private cases were filed. From 1951
through 1955 (the year of the Report) , a total of 1,045 such cases were filed. Jn the single
year of 1977, there were 1,611 private cases filed. The numbers then dropped slightly, with
1,100 such cases filed in 1984. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis
of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1002 (1986).
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commerce concerns were already a reality, even at a time when few
countries other than the United States had antitrust laws. Economics
was still working only at the margins of antitrust decisionmaking. The
placement of the economics chapter suggests an afterthought, or at
least not a perception that economic analysis was central either in the
development of antitrust policy or litigation.
If such a Report were written today, I believe it would look far dif
ferent. Distribution issues would be a minor element. The Robinson
Patman Act would get scant attention. Tying arrangements would un
doubtedly be more directly addressed. Mergers and joint ventures (the
latter not even alluded to in the Report) would take many pages. Sec
tion 2 of the Sherman Act would require more discussion and would
be more controversial. Analysis and critique of government guide
lines, a phenomenon that was nonexistent in 1955, would be signifi
cant. Economic analysis would be given a preeminent, if not predomi
nant, role. A committee of the type that drafted the 1955 Report
would undoubtedly have less patience with simple case analysis and
would be more prone to criticism of established doctrine, making far
heavier use of economics to do so.
I.

THE REPORT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN GENERAL

Before turning to a more detailed consideration of selected sec
tions of the Report and the symposium commentary, several addi
tional general observations are in order. The Report overall, to the
consternation of some of its dissenters, pronounces that the health of
antitrust is good and that little change is necessary.10 As to substantive
doctrine, no legislative changes are proposed except with respect to
the Robinson-Patman Act. This is not to say that all existing substan
tive analysis was thought correct. The Committee majority was obvi
ously confident that the federal enforcement agencies and courts
would be the agencies of change without legislative help. This confi
dence has continued through the present time. The Sherman Act has
long been analogized in its generality and flexibility to the
Constitution, and it has proven to be at least as difficult to amend.
While the Clayton Act has proven somewhat more amenable to
amendment, it has seen no substantive amendment since 1 950. Even
today, the desire for flexibility has trumped attempts to amend these
statutes. It is hardly surprising that the Committee saw no need to do
so, even where court decisions may have appeared to be wrong.
The general thrust of the Report is clear. It contemplates an anti
trust world virtually free of per se rules. Apart from the existing and
well-established per se rules with respect to horizontal and vertical
price fixing, relatively harsh treatment of tying arrangements, and an
10. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
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ambiguity as to whether concerted refusals to deal should be per se il
legal (they are to be viewed as "routine unreasonable restraints"),
Standard Oil's11 rule of reason is to govern cases under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. This will require proof of market power and an assess
ment of competitive effects taking a wide variety of industry factors
into account. Monopolization cases under section 2 should rest on a
careful assessment of monopoly power, based upon market definition
and some use of market shares, as well as other factors that might in
dicate such power. Only where monopoly power is deliberately ac
quired or maintained and not simply the result of the defendant's
"skill, foresight and industry"12 should liability attach. Analysis of
mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act should take into account
of wide variety of factors, with no single factor determinative. The
Robinson-Patman Act should not be read to permit a finding of sec
ondary line injury simply upon proof that the disfavored purchaser
was disadvantaged vis a vis its rivals. Professor Alfred Khan in la
menting the general direction of the Report, a direction he character
ized as "a substantial weakening of the antitrust law," observed that
" [i]t is possible to find almost every section reasonable and moderate,
only to discover at the end that the whole leans - albeit only moder
ately and reasonably - heavily in one direction."13 One need not ac
cept his assertion that the Report would "weaken" the antitrust laws
to agree that the touchstone of the Report is "reasonableness."
A reader familiar with the state of antitrust today would likely
conclude that, apart from some moderation of the Report's severe ap
proach to tying arrangements and today's much more complex analy
sis with respect to concerted refusals to deal, the description given in
the preceding paragraph seems to be a relatively accurate exposition
of the antitrust world of 2001. This is not, however, to attribute much
influence to the Report. To do that, one would have to ignore the im
mediate aftermath of the Report and trace its influence along what
would be an almost tortured and circuitous route. For the 1960s
brought about a proliferation of per se rules, an expansion of
Robinson-Patman Act enforcement and interpretation,14 and an al
most mathematical approach to mergers that a majority of the Re
port's draftsmen would find horrific. The Supreme Court in that pe
riod adopted per se rules against maximum resale maintenance1 5 and
11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
12.

REPORT, supra

note 2, at 56.

13. REPORT, supra note 2, at 393.
14. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'! Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963); United States v. Borden Co. and United States
v. Bowman Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S.
166 (1960).
15. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968).
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vertical territorial restrictions,16 expanded the reach of the per se rules
against minimum vertical price fixing,17 horizontal market alloca
tions,18 and concerted refusals to deal,19 and condemned horizontal
mergers based on relatively low market shares and little else.20 These
rulings had little, if any, basis in economic analysis, resting instead on
concerns over the straits of small entrepreneurs21 or, in one instance,
the property law rule against undue restraints on alienation.22 The six
ties gave us a body of antitrust rules based upon protection of inde
pendent j udgment, individual initiative, and equality of opportunity
that was more consistent with civil rights thinking than economic
analysis.23 It was an antitrust based more on infringement of individual
rights than on any concept of consumer welfare.
The retrenchment of antitrust doctrine beginning in the mid-1970s
has been dramatic. Most of the per se rules adopted in the previous
two decades have disappeared, and the decisions of the Supreme
Court adopting them now overruled.24 Merger analysis is no longer
simply a matter of market definition and adding up market shares.
The approach to mergers today may start with such data, but a far
more complex analysis must be done before liability can be estab
lished.25 We are well on the way to a full-blown efficiencies defense in

16. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
17. Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
18. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). This decision, while de
cided in 1972, is reflective of the expansionary tendency of the sixties.
19. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966). This general numerical approach, relying heavily on rela
tively low market share, is also reflected in the Justice Department's 1968 merger guidelines.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in 4
CCH TRADE REG. REP 'l]13,101 (Mar. 18, 1998). While trying to remain faithful to the Su
preme Court decisions of the time, the 1968 guidelines do attempt to include some other
elements in the analysis. They were still, however virtually mathematical.
21. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
22. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
23. See Thomas E. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: of Economics,
Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 334 (1968).
24. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), was overruled by Continental T. V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977). Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1962), was
overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
25. See u. s. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
(1992), reprinted as amended in 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 'l]l3,104 (Apr. 17,
1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] . For cases illustrating today's more
complex analysis, see Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C.
1997); and Hospital Corp. of America v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court moved away from what had appeared to be a virtually mathematical
approach in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), its last significant
merger decision.
GUIDELINES
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merger cases,26 in sharp contrast to the view expressed by the Supreme
Court in merger decisions of the sixties that because efficiencies
strengthened the merged parties against their competitors, they might
afford a basis for a finding of illegality.27 The Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") has brought but one Robinson-Patman Act case
in the past twelve years, a case that it utilized to set out a less restric
tive standard of competitive harm than that of an earlier time.28 While
private Robinson-Patman cases continue to be brought, the Act has
been significantly curtailed through judicial interpretations contracting
expansionary decisions of the sixties.29
While the drafters of the Report would be far more comfortable
with today's antitrust than with what followed hard on the heels of the
Report's issuance, the changes of the eighties and nineties had little to
do with the Committee's efforts. The changes of the past twenty-five
years in antitrust doctrine, changes usually thought to have begun in
the Supreme Court in its 1977 Continental T. V. decision,30 may be at
tributed to a number of factors, but the Attorney General's Report is
not one of them, at least not in any significant sense. As noted above,
the Supreme Court's decisions in the sixties moved directly away from
the Report's recommendations. In this sense the Report was a failure.
A number of explanations may be offered for the modern antitrust
revolution, none of which can be said to reflect the Report and not all
of which can be fully developed here. The Court's own explanations
for a number of its decisions in the sixties were simply inadequate,
leaving readers and lower courts, which often resisted the lead of the
Court, both dissatisfied and increasingly cynical about what the Court
was doing. The Court had left a kind of intellectual vacuum. I sug
gested in a 1968 Michigan Law Review article that there was "some
danger that [the Court] may become a Pied Piper with an unheeded
tune."31 And so it became.
26. The U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines were amended in 1997 to deal more fully
with efficiency claims. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at § 4. A number
of lower court cases have now recognized a limited efficiencies defense. See Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Long
Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Butter
worth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd per curiam, 121 F.3d 708
(6th Cir. 1997).
27. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
28. McCormick & Co., Inc., FTC Complaints & Orders, [1997-2001 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'l[24,711 (April 27, 2000) (applying the so-called Morton Salt pre
sumption only where respondent was a dominant firm and secondary line discrimination
threatened competitive injury to seller's own competition).
29. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993) (curtailing, if not overruling, Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'I Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967));
Falls City Ind., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983).
30. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
31. Kauper, supra note 23, at 342.
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Some would attribute many of the changes in antitrust doctrine
over the last two and a half decades to the economic analysis identi
fied today with the Chicago School.32 The views of people like Profes
sors Ward Bowman, Robert Bork and Richard Posner33 were more
compelling than the rationale of a number of Supreme Court cases
and, with their emphasis on economic efficiency, found ready listeners
in the legal and business community at a time when American busi
nesses were threatened in their home markets by a dramatic increase in
imports and found it more difficult to compete in foreign markets.
While antitrust teachings of the Chicago School have never been ac
cepted in their entirety (to the extent it is fair to speak of them as a
single set of views at all), they led the debate over antitrust's goals and
to the general acceptance of the view that the sole goal of antitrust is
the achievement of economic efficiency and that neoclassical price
theory is the best tool for arriving at proper outcomes. Antitrust re
form was also a part of the broader deregulation movement, a move
ment well under way by the late seventies. As individuals who were, at
least to some extent, sympathetic to Chicago School thinking came to
head the major enforcement agencies, those agencies themselves
played a major role in cutting back antitrust regulation.34 The agencies
in turn had considerable influence on the judiciary, particularly during
the eighties as Reagan and Bush appointees became an ever growing
percentage of federal judges. While a variety of elements converged to
bring about shifts in doctrine, there is no reason to believe they are in
any sense attributable to the Report.
This is not to say that the Report was without influence. A number
of its proposals for new legislation, many in the procedural area, were
enacted within a relatively short time of the Report's release. The An
titrust Civil Process Act,35 which granted the Department of Justice
authority to use civil investigative demands to compel the production
32. For a succinct sununary of the views of the Chicago School, see
(2d ed. 1999).

HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 60-62

33. For representative writings, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (rev.
ed. 1993); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LA W (1976); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Ar
rangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); and Richard A. Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
34. Perhaps the greatest single influence on the development of modern merger law was
the issuance, under the direction of Assistant Attorney General William Baxter, of the
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines in 1982. These guidelines introduced a far greater
degree of economic analysis, moved away from the simple mathematical approach of the
sixties and, contracted the expansionist approach of that period. See Donald I. Baker &
William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 311 (1983).
More recent guidelines are simply modifications of those of 1982, which therefore have con
tinued to impact public merger enforcement to the present day. They have also heavily in
fluenced courts in litigated cases. See, e.g. , Fed. Trade Comm'n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d
708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Fed. Trade Conun'n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997);
United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
35. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1311-1314 (1994)
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of documents in civil investigations prior to the filing of a complaint,
was enacted substantially as proposed in the Report.36 The
Committee's recommendation rested largely on the need to give some
form of compulsory process in civil cases in order to avoid what at
least some members perceived as a history of abuse of the grand jury
process. Members of the Committee might well have been disturbed,
however, when in 1976 this authority was extended to demands for
written interrogatories and the taking of testimony concerning docu
ments, and removed the limitation that such demands could be di
rected only at potential targets.37
The most immediate legislative response came within three
months, when three of the Report's recommendations were enacted at
the same time.38 For the first time, private treble damage actions were
made subject to a federal statute of limitations.39 Suits by the United
States to recover single damages where it was an injured party were
authorized.40 The Report also recommended an increase in maximum
criminal fines under the Sherman Act from $5,000 to $10,000, rejecting
the increase to $50,000 sought by some members. Reciting a long his
tory of fines ranging from $100 to $500, the Committee expressed the
belief that the existing maximum was generally adequate. An increase
to $10,000 was justified by the need "to take some account of infla
tion. "41 Given the fact that the maximum fine had been $5000 from
1890 to 1955, the proposed increase was hardly adequate even as an
inflation adjustment. Just three months after publication of the report
Congress raised the maximum to $50,000.42 The Committee's recom
mendation was given more effect than it wanted. All of this seems al
most amazingly antique today when fines have ranged as high as half a

36. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 26 Stat. 548 (1962).
37. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383, 1384-85 (1976).
38. Act of Jul. 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 137-583, 69 Stat. 283 (amending the Clayton Act)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994)) [hereinafter Public Law 137].
39. 15 u.s.c. § 15b (1994).
40. The 1955 legislation authorized recovery of single damages by the United States. As
the result of further amendment, the United States may now recover treble damages. 15
U.S.C. § 15a (1994)
41. REPORT, supra note 2, at 352.
42. Public Law 137, supra note 38, at ch. 282. The maximum statutory fine in the
Sherman Act today is $10 million for corporations and $350,000 for individuals. Individuals
may also be sentenced to a maximum of three years in prison, an increase over the maximum
of one year as the Act was originally enacted. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Today most sentencing is
under the Criminal Fines Enforcement Act of 1984, which sets a maximum of double the
pecuniary gain derived or double the pecuniary loss imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3623 (1986) (re
pealed in 1987); Criminal Fine Improvement Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. 3571 (1994) (reauthor
izing the potentially significant fine).
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billion dollars.43 In 1955, it apparently did not occur to anybody on the
Committee to refer to jail sentences. No consideration was given to
any increase in the maximum of up to one year. Given the extraordi
nary emphasis on the use of criminal processes and sanctions today,
the recommended fine levels and inattention to jail sentences may
seem surprising; it is an indication that antitrust of 1955 was far more
gentlemanly than it is now, when the use of leniency programs,44 FBI
agents, search warrants and consensual eavesdropping45 are common
place.46
II.

THE REPORT AND THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST

As already noted, chapter 1 of the Report deals generally with the
substance of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The chapter consists
almost entirely of case analysis of horizontal and vertical price fixing,
trade association statistical activities, horizontal and vertical market
division, monopolization and attempts and conspiracies to monopo
lize. The text is bland, the analysis is careful and for the most part un
exceptional. Criticism of doctrine (and therefore of the courts) is vir
tually nonexistent. What is striking in this chapter is its simplicity and
the relatively few cases (by today's standards) that are discussed. It is
as though all section 1 problems were in one of the categories just de
scribed. And, in 1955, there was some truth to that. These were the is
sues most cases dealt with, although it is hardly so today. The drafts
men of chapter 1 were satisfied with the law as it stood and did not use
the Report as a vehicle to speculate about issues that might arise in the
future.
There are some oddities in this general analysis. Horizontal and
vertical price fixing (resale price maintenance) are discussed together

43. This was the fine paid by F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. in the Vitamins cartel case.
BASF paid a fine of $225 million in the same case. Both eclipsed the previous record fines,
$110 million paid by UCAR International in the Graphic Electrodes case and $100 million
paid by Archer Daniels Midland Co. in the Citric Acid cartel prosecution. See Harry First,
The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming ofInternational Competition Law, 68
L.J. 711, 715, 720-21 (2001).

ANTITRUST

44. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (Aug. 10,
1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm.
45. The Justice Department has publicly released a videotape, entitled "The Interna
tional Lysine Cartel at Work," containing excerpts from both video and audio surveillance in
the Lysine Cartel case.
46. The Report also recommended that the granting of treble, as opposed to single,
damages should be put in the trial judge's discretion, rather than the mandatory trebling re
quired in private antitrust actions for damages. REPORT, supra note 2, at 378-80. The
Congress has never been willing to make such a change. Mandatory trebling is still required
today. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1994). The small section in the Report where this recommendation
appears is at its very end and is virtually the only place where private actions are even men
tioned.
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as though they were without significant differences.47 Yet horizontal
and vertical market division agreements are treated as wholly separate
from each other, with the former condemned outright and the latter
requiring analysis under the ancillary restraint doctrine.48 Horizontal
and vertical price fixing are to be "conclusively presumed" illegal.49 In
terestingly, these conclusions reflect the state of the law today (al
though the Supreme Court's treatment of vertical territorial and cus
tomer restraints has hardly been one of its finer performances).50 We
now know, however, that vertical and horizontal arrangements are
sharply different in effect. Resale price maintenance is not simply a
variation of horizontal price fixing, either in terms of purpose or ef
fect.51
Only two issues relating to horizontal agreements received special
attention. They were obviously particularly vexing questions of the
day. One - the treatment of so-called conscious parallelism - still is.
The other - the question of intra-enterprise conspiracy - has largely
been laid to rest. The evidentiary relevance of uniform pricing in
highly concentrated industries - pricing that is interdependent with
the pricing of one's rivals - has long been debated.52 Economic theory
47.

REPORT, supra

note 2, at 12-16.

48. Id. at 26-27.
49. Id. at 12. The Report here uses the language of the Standard Oil case, supra note 1 1 .
I n this chapter the Report carefully avoids using the label "unreasonable per se." More curi
ous is that its discussion of horizontal price fixing omits any reference to footnote 59 in
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), perhaps the most famous foot
note in antitrust history. The footnote recites that in a price-fixing case, the plaintiff need not
show market power, actual effect, or even any overt act. Proof of the agreement is itself suf
ficient. The omission of these points suggests the Committee was uneasy about the contents
of the footnote.
50. The Court rejected an argument that such restraints were per se illegal in White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), asserting that it did not know "enough

of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge" to condemn
them out of hand. Only four years later it had apparently learned what it needed, ruling in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967) that all such restraints were
per se illegal because they violated "the ancient rule against restraints on alienation."
Schwinn was in turn overruled in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58
(1977).
51. Horizontal price fixing is condemned because of its adverse price and output effects,
effects that result from aggregating the market power of otherwise independent competitors.
This interbrand effect is to be contrasted with the adverse intrabrand effect of vertical price
fixing, price fixing that on its face sets the price only on a given brand. Vertical price fixing is
far more akin to vertical territorial and customer restrictions in effect. Both types of prac
tices may enhance interbrand competition in some cases. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra
note 32, at 441-58. In a few cases, vertical price and non-price restraints can be used to facili
tate collusion and thus reduce interbrand competition but this horizontal effect is far less
obvious than with horizontal price fixing. See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S.
717 (1988).
52. The classic articles in the debate are Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969), and Donald F. Turner, The
Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal,
75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
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teaches that without overt collusion firms in highly concentrated mar
kets may achieve cartel-like prices.53 Does the proof of such pricing
constitute price fixing, the agreement being inferred from an invitation
to collude and a uniform response in circumstances when it is in the
interest of each firm only when others behave in parallel fashion? The
Report concludes that while evidence of uniformity is relevant to
proof of agreement, it is normally not in and of itself sufficient, absent
other factors also suggestive of collusion. No inference of agreement is
appropriate where the conduct has independent justification.54 The
Report is based primarily on the Committee's reading of the Interstate
Circuit55 and Theatre Enterprises56 cases, the same cases that bound the
inquiry today. The Supreme Court has now pronounced that oligopoly
pricing is not itself unlawful.57 The standard formulation today - that
interdependence alone does not establish agreement and that some
"plus" factor indicative of collusion must be shown58 - would please
the members of the Committee. The law remains basically the same as
its Report describes.
The Committee is remarkably cautious about the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine. In its simplest form, the Supreme Court cases
from which the doctrine evolved seemed to hold that a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiaries or two subsidiaries of the same parent are
legally capable of conspiracy.59 The Report specifically recommended
that the Supreme Court reconsider the doctrine to the extent that it
required competition among such subsidiaries, but rather timidly sug
gests that section 1 "may be transgressed" where a parent and subsidi
ary act to exclude a rival.60 This conclusion is indicative of the Report's
desire to stay within the bounds of decided cases. Confronted with a
doctrine devoid of economic sense, the Committee read the decided
cases restrictively but was unprepared to press for elimination of the

53. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 156-63.
54. REPORT, supra note 2, at 39-40.
55. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
56. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
57. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993).
58. This formulation is found in literally scores of cases. For recent examples, see Blom
kest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2000);
and In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1999).
v. Yel
Joseph£. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,

59. The early cases from which this doctrine allegedly derived are United States
low Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) and Kiefer-Stewart Co.

v.

340 U.S. 211 (1951). These are the primary cases analyzed in the Report.
60. REPORT, supra note 2, at 35.
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doctrine altogether. It took the Supreme Court another thirty-nine
years finally to lay the doctrine to rest.61
The Report's treatment of monopolization under section 2 of the
Sherman Act62 is relatively brief, and the Committee appeared to be
satisfied with the law as it then stood. The Report had relatively few
cases to work with, but among them were both Alcoa63 and United
Shoe,64 cases still heavily relied upon today. The impression left after
reading the Report's monopolization segment is that the law of section
2 today has not developed much beyond 1955. The Report asserts that
the two elements of the offense are the possession of monopoly power
and the use of deliberate and exclusionary conduct either in its acqui
sition or maintenance. As to the first, the starting point is market defi
nition and computation of market share. The determination of the ex
istence of monopoly power requires the drawing of inferences from
market share and a variety of performance factors. Consideration
must also be given to entry factors. Judge Hand's magical numbers
from Alcoa are said to be helpful.65 The report deals with the conduct
element in little more than five pages. Beyond talking generally about
conduct that drives competitors out of the market or deliberately im
pairs them, the Report makes little effort to identify specific types of
conduct proof of which could satisfy plaintiff's burden. More attention
is paid to the so-called "thrust upon" defense, but the Report does lit
tle beyond setting forth lengthy quotations from the Alcoa and United
Shoe cases.66
Why was the Report not more specific? The simple answer is that
with a statute that defines an offense in one word - "monopolize" and a methodology relying on decided cases, greater specificity was
not possible without venturing into a wide variety of conduct that
might be deemed exclusionary about which there had been no litiga
tion.
Despite the Report's generality, the general section 2 standards it
sets forth are little different than those applied today. Juries are still
instructed in these broad terms.67 Some progress towards fleshing out
61. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-74 (1984), the
Court finally rejected any contrary implication in earlier cases and held that a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiaries were incapable of conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.
62. 15 u.s.c. § 2 (1994).
63. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
64. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
65. In a famous passage, Judge Hand states that a ninety-percent market share was in
dicative of monopoly, that sixty percent was doubtful and thirty-three percent clearly was
not. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424.
66.

REPORT, supra note

2, at 56-60.

67. See the jury instruction set forth in Aspen Skiing Co.
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-97 (1985).

v.

Aspen Highland Skiing
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the statute has been made, if for no other reason than the much larger
number of decided cases from which greater precision can be drawn.
Today, for example, there are more specific standards dealing with
leveraging68, essential facilities69 and predatory pricing.70 A monopolist
may price to meet competition71, but cannot utilize sham litigation to
exclude rivals or raise their costs.72 In short, as more and more con
crete cases are decided, the rules governing the conduct of monopo
lists have become more specific. Yet the very broad "deliberate and
exclusionary" conduct remains in place, supplemented by a new stan
dard pursuant to which courts have been relatively quick to shift to the
defendant the burden to come forth with a legitimate business justifi
cation for its actions. Made explicit by the Supreme Court in its Aspen
Ski case,73 this burden shifting has become commonplace in major sec
tion 2 cases such as Kodak14 and Microsoft.15 Today, then, once a court
is satisfied that the conduct at issue is "deliberate and exclusionary," a
standard that often seems easily met, the burden of explanation falls
on the defendant. The drafters of the Report would be entirely com
fortable with such an approach, so long as care is taken in finding con
duct that is in fact exclusionary. While economic analysis has been
useful in these cases, it has not predominated as it has, for example, in
merger cases where the Merger Guidelines have considerable impact
in court decisionmaking. We have no such guidelines for section 2
cases. Perhaps the time has come that we should.

68. Derived from United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), the leveraging doctrine
applies where a monopolist uses its monopoly power, even if lawfully acquired, to foreclose
competition or gain a competitive advantage in a second market. There is currently a con
troversy about whether such conduct is itself a violation of section 2 or whether an attempt
to monopolize the second market must be shown. Compare Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1992) (not a separate
offense) with Kerasotes Michigan Theatres, Inc. v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135 (6th
Cir. 1988) (separate offense), and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (separate offense). The Second Circuit has
since described its statement in Berkey as dictum. AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d
216, 230 (2d Cir. 1999).
69. The essential facility doctrine requires a monopolist to provide competitors access to
a facility it controls that is essential to their ability to compete and which they cannot rea
sonably duplicate, if such access is feasible. See, e.g. , Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.
1986). The doctrine has been severely criticized. See generally, Phillip Areeda, Essential Fa
cilities: an Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989).
70. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
71. See Telex Corp. v. lnt'l Bus. Machs. Corp. , 510 F.2d 894, 927-28 (10th Cir. 1975).
72. The standards with respect to "sham litigation" are set forth in Professional Real
Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
73. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 583 (1985).
74. Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1212 (9th Cir. 1996)
75. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Ill. DISTRIBUTION AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Report's chapter on distribution issues was clearly done by a
different subcommittee. It is both more vigorous and emphatic in en
dorsing existing law in some areas and more willing to be critical in
others (perhaps because it had more to be critical about). The Report
"subscribes to vigorous condemnation of concerted and conspiratorial
refusals to deal" that coerce outsiders,76 finds little or no virtue in tying
arrangements77 and views simple refusals to deal by non-monopolists
as virtually sacrosanct.78 In each of these instances, the Report's view
is based upon and is satisfied with what it views as existing law. While
several Committee members found some virtue in resale price main
tenance, a practice they felt assisted small businessmen by eliminating
loss leaders and irresponsible price cutting,79 the majority of the
Committee urged repeal of the Sherman Act amendments authorizing
resale price maintenance, and a return to the underlying prohibition of
the practice that would otherwise govern.80 The Congress did ulti
mately repeal the amendments, but not until 1975.81
The Report is sharply critical of the Supreme Court's decision in
Standard Stations,82 a case involving exclusive dealing. It is described
as "a perplexing opinion whose rationale is not clear."83 The Report
characterizes the holding as one finding competitive injury in exclusive
dealing cases upon a simple showing that the contracts at issue in
volved a "substantial number of outlets" or volume of trade.84 This
"quantitative substantiality" test is the target of the Report's criticism.
But what to do with Standard Stations? As Kenneth Debevoise put it,
" [t]he [C]ommittee resorts to a not altogether successful tour de
force,"85 noting that the Federal Trade Commission in several subse
quent proceedings did not apply the test of Standard Stations. It obvi
ously hoped that subsequent judicial interpretations would eliminate
the problem (an approach that permeates the Report). Its hope turned
76.

REPORT, supra note

2, at 137.

77. Id. at 145.
78. Id. at 134.
79. Id. at 154-55.
80. Id. at 154. Under the so-called Fair Trade amendments to the Sherman Act, resale
price maintenance (vertical price fixing) was exempt from the Sherman Act if practiced in a
state where state law authorized it. Without such an exemption resale price maintenance is
per se illegal.
81. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
82. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293 (1949)
(Standard Stations is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Oil).
83.

REPORT, supra note 2,

at 141.

84. Id.
85. DeBevoise, supra note 1, at 1077.
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out to be justified. The Committee's "actual foreclosure" test, and the
manner in which the Committee would apply it, is fully consistent with
the law as it stands today, where most exclusive dealing by non
monopolists is viewed as efficiency enhancing.s6 The Committee's
criticism may well have had a significant impact in the development of
today's standards.
The Committee's Report had far less immediate effect on the in
terpretation and enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act,s7 even
though it is the focus of some of the harshest criticism in the Report.
The Committee had little to say about the application of the Act in
cases where price discrimination allegedly injured competition at the
primary level (the level of the seller and its rivals). The primary con
cern of the Robinson-Patman Act is with injury at the level of the fa
vored and disfavored buyers. It is logical therefore that the Report is
directed at these so-called secondary line cases.
The Report's consideration of the Act begins with the observation
that it is difficult to reconcile the economic theory on which the
Robinson-Patman Act rests with that underlying the Sherman Act,
and that the judicial process has resolved every statutory doubt in fa
vor of the antitrust directives of the Sherman Act.ss The Committee
does the same. As put by Kendall Debevoise:
The committee members, too, are chronological i n their thinking. I n
the beginning was the Sherman Act, a n d it was good. Later came the
Clayton Act, and it was good, but no matter what additional purposes it
may have had, it should be read i n the full light of the Sherman Act.
Later came the Robinson-Patman Act, hard after a tragic depression
and, on a different economic theory, addressed to different economic
problems. The committee had to fish or cut bait.
I submit that it cut bait. But the choices were difficult.s9

Those choices, as put by Mr. Debevoise, were to disapprove of the Act
as unwise, recommend substantial legislative overhaul, read the act
strictly without regard to legislative inconsistencies, or try to harmo
nize all antitrust legislation through interpretation. He correctly ob
serves that the Committee took the last course. In so doing, it may
have missed a golden opportunity for meaningful reform.
Nowhere is the Committee's harmonization approach more clear
than in its treatment of proof of competitive injury in cases of price
discrimination among competitive buyers. The original version of sec-

86. See
dards.

HOVENKAMP, supra

note 32, at 430-39 for a summary of the prevailing stan

87. The Robinson-Patman Act was a 1936 amendment to § 2 of the Clayton Act, now
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1994) .
88. REPORT, supra note 2, at 131-32.
89. Debevoise, supra note 1, at 1073-74.
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tion 2 of the Clayton Act prohibited price discrimination where the ef
fect "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce,"90 the language used throughout
the Act's substantive provisions. Concerned with the rise of large
chain stores, stores that received large discounts to their advantage
over smaller stores, Congress in the Robinson-Patman Act added to
the injury standard an alternative standard prohibiting discrimination
where the effect was to "injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them. "91 Congress
clearly meant to put the focus on injury at the buyer ("secondary")
level and to do something in terms of injury that was not the same as
the existing standard. The question for the Committee is what that
was, a question still debated today. For the Committee, the conclusion
drawn from a handful of cases was that the courts were both free and
under a duty to construe this language in accord with the broader anti
trust policies of the Sherman Act. This, in turn, would focus the injury
requirement not on harm to individual disadvantaged competitors but
on "the health of the competitive process."92 The net effect of the
Committee's view, as Mr. Debevoise notes, was that Congress in fact
"did not add anything new."93
The Committee's view of the injury requirement may make per
fectly good sense in economic terms, but the law did not develop as it
recommended. Even today, the injury to competition at the secondary
level can be inferred where substantial price differences exist between
competing purchasers operating in otherwise competitive markets.
The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement is simply that injury may
be inferred where some purchasers pay "substantially more for their
goods than their competition had to pay. "94 The focus is on injury to
disadvantaged competitors, not on the market's structure or process, a
standard that makes no pretense of reconciling the Sherman and
Robinson-Patman Acts. This inference of harm is drawn, as everyone
who has ever dealt with Robinson-Patman cases knows, from the
Supreme Court's 1 948 decision in Federal Trade Commission v.
Morton Salt Co.,95 a decision mentioned only once in the Report, and
then in a footnote.96 The Report tries to limit the decision to allowing
permissive inferences to be drawn in administrative proceedings. The
90. Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 2, 38 stat. 730, S 2 (1914).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994).
92.

REPORT, supra note 2,

at 165.

93. Debevoise, supra note 1, at 1082.
94. Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 559 (1990).
95. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
96.

REPORT, supra

note 2, at 165 n.118.
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Committee seems satisfied that FfC cases subsequent to Morton Salt
confirm its view both of that case and of what it believes the law
should be. This treatment of what is still the leading case on secondary
injury may be characterized as a good try. It failed. But as a result of
its analysis (hope?), the Committee did not urge substantial legislative
revision of the Act. And its recommendation on this point did not gain
judicial acceptance.97 The Committee labored, but in the end for
naught.
The Committee was no more successful in trying to put life into the
Act's cost justification defense, a defense it characterized as "largely
illusory in practice." The legislative text of the defense is characterized
by the Report as "prolix and perplexing,"98 as indeed it is. The Report
calls for the FfC to adopt "realistic" cost accounting standards, that it
avoid "precise and mechanical rules" and that "reasonable approxima
tions" be sufficient.99 As put by Mr. Debevoise, "the [C]ommittee has
conceded, in effect, that it doesn't exactly know what to do about [it],
except that the Federal Trade Commission ought to be 'reasonable'
about it. "100 In the end, the FfC and the courts made little change in
the defense's standard. Without legislative change, which the Report
again did not urge, the defense is as illusory today as it was in 1955.
The Report's discussion of the meeting competition defense is a
further reflection of the Committee's emphasis on reconciliation of the
Robinson-Patman Act with what it views as the core antitrust statutes.
It begins with a lengthy discussion of what was then a very sensitive
issue, namely, whether the defense is absolute, applicable without re
gard to whether competition is injured. The ability of a firm to re
spond to a competitor's prices is viewed as the essence of competition,
and to hold the defense other than absolute "would move the price
discrimination statute into irreconcilable conflict with the Sherman
Act."101 This is a point long ago settled in accord with the Committee's
view.102 The Report contains a number of other then debatable inter97. The closest any court has come to acceptance of the Committee's view is in Boise
v. Federal Trade Commission, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988), where the court
concluded over a vigorous dissent that the Commission erred when it rejected evidence of
the health of competition in the buyer's market. The dissent stressed that the court's ap
proach was inconsistent both with Morton Salt and the Act's legislative history. Subsequent
cases have rejected the approach of Boise Cascade. See Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods.
Corp., 111 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 943 (1997); George Haug Co.
v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, 148 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1998).
Cascade Corp.

98.

REPORT,

supra note 2, at 172.

99.

REPORT,

supra note 2, at 174-75.

100. DeBevoise, supra note 1, at 1084.
101.

REPORT,

supra note 2, at 181.

102. The issue was settled in Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (Indiana),
340 U.S. 231 (1951), a decision the Report enthusiastically endorses, although there seems to
be no need to stress the point.
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pretations of the defense, as follows. While there are circumstances
where a seller may be denied the defense because the price it is meet
ing is unlawful, the seller should be deemed to have met a lawful price
unless it knew or should have known otherwise. The defense should
not be limited to meeting only temporary or sporadic price offering of
rivals. Undercutting of a rival's price should be permitted if the seller
has acted in a good faith belief that it was simply matching the price
offered. The defense should not be limited to retaining existing cus
tomers but should be equally available in seeking new customers. The
Commission saw no need for legislative change to accomplish these
ends, believing the statute would likely be interpreted as it proposed.
It turned out to be right on all of these points, but only after the
Supreme Court removed much of the muddle created by the FTC and
courts in the 1960s with its 1983 decision in the Falls City Industries
case.103
At a time when there had been little litigation and few rulings on
the treatment under the Act of functional discounts, the Committee
took the subject on directly, one of the few places where it ventured
into new territory. To take the simplest case, assume a manufacturer
sells to wholesalers that in turn sell to a reseller. The manufacturer
also sells direct to some retailers. When it grants the wholesaler a dis
count in recognition of its performance of wholesale functions, that
discount generally causes no adverse effect at the buyer level, even
though direct buying retailers receive no discount, since the wholesal
ers and retailers do not compete for the same customers. But suppose
the manufacturer sells to a wholesaler with a wholesale discount and
the wholesaler also functions as a retailer. A competing retailer buying
direct from the manufacturer receives no such discount. The Commit
tee's answer is that, where the integrated wholesaler-retailer actually
performs wholesale functions, it is lawfully entitled to a wholesale dis
count. If the integrated firm elects to charge a lower price to its retail
buyers than its direct buying competitors, that is its own decision.
Suppliers should not be held responsible for their purchasers' pricing
tactics. The Committee believed that the statute could be so inter
preted without legislative intervention.
Over the ensuing years, the legality of functional discounts re
mained something of a puzzle to lawyers and businesspeople, with the
result that pricing decisions were often turned over to lawyers who
were supposed to have answers under the Act. Like many of its rec
ommendations, the Report's functional discount proposals found little

103. Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983). In Falls City, the
Court held that the defense is unavailable if the plaintiff, which has the burden, can prove
that the prices that were met were actually met, resolving some of the ambiguity on the point
created by the Standard Oil case, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). It further held that the defense could
be used where the seller discriminated in gaining a new customer.
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immediate following.104 The Supreme Court finally addressed the func
tional discount issue thirty-five years after the Report's release in
Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 105 a case involving a refiner who sold to
wholesalers at a price significantly below its price to retailers that in
turn competed with purchasers from the favored wholesalers, pur
chasers that were charged less by those wholesalers than the prices at
which the refiner sold direct to retailers. The Court quotes the
Committee's recommendations in full and states its general agreement
with them. But having said that, the Court holds in essence that be
cause the refiner's price to its wholesalers was in excess of either the
supplier's savings in not performing wholesale functions or the whole
salers costs in doing so, the wholesale discount was unreasonable and
in violation of the Act. In short, the refiner was found to have simply
passed an advantage through the wholesaler to its customers. The
Report was recognized, but its analysis was found somewhat wanting.
The Committee, dealing with a set of complex and unresolved ques
tions, may simply not have perceived all the subtleties the future
would bring.
Today's reader of the Report's treatment of the Robinson-Patman
Act will undoubtedly conclude that it met with only modest success.
Many of its recommendations fell on deaf ears. Those recommenda
tions for change that did ultimately work their way into today's legal
standards did so many years after the Report, only after the FTC and
courts retreated from very strict standards adopted during a period of
very zealous Robinson-Patman enforcement throughout the sixties.
This is perhaps in part because the Report's recommendations rest on
reconciliation of the Act with the broader competition standards of
the Sherman Act. The courts, however, came for the most part to the
conclusion that what the Report sought to reconcile was irreconcil
able, that these pieces of legislation are predicated on policies that do
in fact conflict, but that this is what the Congress intended. A number
of the Report's recommendations are calls for flexible or "reasonable"
104. For example, the FTC, even after 1955, held that where a wholesaler is controlled
by a retailer it could not receive a wholesale discount even if it actually performed wholesale
functions. In re Nat'! Parts Warehouse, 63 F.T.C. 1692 (1963), affd sub nom. Gen. Auto
Supplies v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 923
(1965). A wholesaler that sold some of the purchased good to retailers and some as a retailer
could not receive the wholesale discount on the portion of the goods it received as a retailer.
In re Boise Cascade Corp., 107 F.T.C. 76 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 837 F.2d 1 127 (D.C.
Cir. 1988). Only if the seller could establish that such a wholesale discount was no more than
the cost savings to the seller of not performing the wholesale function itself, thus satisfying
the cost justification defense in section 2(c) of the Act, was the discount legitimate. In re
Mueller Co., 60 F.T.C. 120, 127-28 (1962), affd, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 923 (1964). In so holding, the FTC in Mueller rejected its own earlier decision in In re
Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955), holding that such a discount was lawful if it reflected
no more than the costs to the buyer of any wholesale functions it actually performed, a stan
dard in accord with the Report.
105. 496 U.S. 543 (1990).
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administrative interpretations of the Act by the Federal Trade
Commission. But in the sixties, the FTC went in a totally different di
rection. Moreover, the Committee's assumption that change would
come from the FTC virtually ignores the fact that, like it or not, that
agency was not then, and is not now, the only enforcer of the Act.
Here, as elsewhere in the report, the Committee virtually ignores pri
vate enforcement, a process in which the FTC has little or nothing to
say. Its views may carry slight weight in courts deciding cases to which
it is not even a party.
The Report's treatment of the Robinson-Patman Act was an ex
cellent study guide and source book for lawyers and law students, but
it had only a modest influence on the development of the law. This
prompts the obvious question whether when it "cut bait" it should
have recognized the clear inconsistencies between the Robinson
Patman Act and the rest of our antitrust laws and pushed for signifi
cant legislative change. To those of us who believe, as the Committee
did, that the Act often stifles competition and unnecessarily raises
both compliance costs and prices, and who look back on this portion
of the Report with the benefit of hindsight, that would have been the
preferable course. But we would also have to admit that despite per
sistent criticism and recommendations for change, at no time during
the ensuing forty-six years has the Congress shown the slightest will
ingness to amend the Act. The small business community has always
opposed change. The Act has achieved virtual icon status. This may be
lamentable but it is the reality. The Committee may have sensed this
and opted for what it thought it could get. That turned out to be rela
tively little.106
IV. THE REPORT AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
Some will be surprised to learn that the 1955 Report dealt with the
antitrust laws and foreign commerce at all, and even more to know
that the Report spent nearly fifty pages on the subject. Because inter
national cartel prosecutions seem a phenomenon of the past decade, at
least to those with short memories, it may seem hard to imagine that

106. The Report also criticized both the language and prevailing interpretations of sec
tions 2(c)(d) and (e) of the Act, provisions dealing with payments of brokerage and provi
sion of promotional and advertising allowances and services. These provisions contain no
explicit requirement of any injury to competition, leading the Committee to conclude that
these sections should be reconciled at least with the remainder of the Act. The Committee
did not urge legislative reform of these sections other than section 2(c), believing that inter
pretive reform could itself remedy what it saw as the deficiencies in section 2(d) and ( e) If
the Committee meant that either the FTC or courts could engraft some standards based on
competitive harm onto these sections, it is hard to imagine that this could be done without
statutory amendment. The Committee also urged statutory repeal of section 3 of the Act, its
only criminal provision. None of the changes urged in these sections by the Report has oc
curred.
.
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the Report embraced a full-blown concept of extraterritoriality in
terms varying little from the same principle applied today, recognized
that American antitrust law applies not only to restraints originating
abroad that impact American domestic markets but to our export
trade as well, and expressed concern over international cartels. It did
all of these things in terms familiar today. At the same time, the
Report contains much that is unfamiliar, raising issues that today have
no currency.
In its approach to extraterritoriality, the Report once again relies
heavily on a detailed analysis of existing cases with little policy com
mentary.107 Agreements among U.S. firms, or U.S. firms and foreign
firms, even when entered into abroad, are within the substantive juris
diction of the Sherman Act if they have "substantial anticompetitive
effects"108 on American commerce. This proposition seems unexcep
tionable today.109 Agreements among only foreign firms can be
reached only where "they are intended to, and actually do, result in
substantial anticompetitive effects on our foreign commerce. "110 This
was a debatable proposition at the time.111 In terms of jurisdiction to
day, no distinction is drawn among conspiracies based on the citizen
ship of the actors,112 although it may have some bearing on application
of comity doctrines.113 It is sufficient that there is a substantial effect
107. In working its way through a number of decided cases, the Report puts to one side
the baffling decision of the Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347 (1909), which can clearly be read as rejecting the whole concept of extraterritorial
ity in antitrust cases, and relies instead on the "effects" test set forth in United States v. Alu
minum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Given the fact that the Supreme Court
had not then clearly stated a simple "effects" standard, the Committee here was pushing the
law more than it did in some other areas.
108. REPORT, supra note 2, at 76.
109. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993), the Court
concluded that while "the proposition was perhaps not always free from doubt [citing
A merican Banana), it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States." It had said much the same in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S.
690, 705 (1962). In United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998), the court, relying on Hartford, concluded that criminal
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act extended to price fixing by a Japanese defendant in Ja
pan, where the product at issue was to be shipped to the United States.
1 10. REPORT, supra note 2, at 76.
1 1 1 . Debatable if for no other reason than the fact that virtually all significant decided
cases until 1955 in some way involved participation by at least one American firm. This was

true in all of the cases discussed in connection with the issue of extraterritoriality in the Re
port.
1 12. Hartford draws no such distinction. See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.1 (1995) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
GUIDELINES], reprinted in 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 'II 13,107 (Apr. 5, 1995).
1 13. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608 (nationality of firms
one of a number of factors to be considered in comity analysis). For a similar approach, see
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on American commerce or, in cases covered by the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act,114 that there is "a direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect."115 The Committee's commitment to a
relatively broad principle of extraterritoriality suffers from a lack of
any real policy discussion, but that is true of much of a report focused
heavily on decided cases.
The history of extraterritorial enforcement by the United States is
checkered with objections from foreign governments, with claims of
conflicting sovereignty, assertions of immunity, and arguments about
appropriate remedies. 1 16 Foreign governments reacted angrily when
their own nationals were subjected to the jurisdiction of American
courts, a j urisdiction asserted in an increasing number of cases. In
some cases, foreign sovereigns took measures to counter the ability of
American courts to proceed117 or to ameliorate the effects of treble
damages.118 The Committee was aware that what it characterized as
"international complications" were likely to arise. It specifically in
cluded the intent element in cases involving only foreign nationals
taking action abroad to ameliorate some of these "complications." It
anticipated today's "sovereign compulsion" defense when it concluded
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979), and
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 112, at § 32.

Mannington Mills, Inc.

114. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994), referred to as "FTAIA."
115. The Act does not cover conduct involving direct imports into the United States, but
does extend to conduct involving foreign nations that has an indirect effect on import trade
or impacts export trade with foreign nations. Conduct abroad that affects American exports
thus is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. The Report, without spe
cific discussion assumed this was so. In its 1988 International Operations Guidelines (repro
duced as amended at 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. '1[13,109 (Nov. 10, 1988)), the Department of
Justice in footnote 159 indicated that regardless of the FT AIA, it was concerned as an en
forcement matter with adverse effects on American consumers and, this implies, not with
restraints having an effect only on American exporters. This footnote was ultimately super
seded by a new statement of policy by the Department that it will, in some cases, take en
forcement actions against foreign restraints on American exports, a position reiterated in the
current International Operations Guidelines, supra note 112, at § 3.31.
116. A number of these protests and claims are discussed in detail in I WILBUR
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.16 (4th ed. 1991).

L.

117. So-called "blocking" statues were passed in a number of countries. These statutes
vary in content but typically bar citizens of the country in question from turning over docu
ments pursuant to a foreign court order if such production would be contrary to an order of
the appropriate government agency. See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch.
11 (Eng.). Similar statutes were enacted in Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, New
Zealand and South Africa. See 1-A BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 718-36 (rev. 2d ed. supp.
1993). Such statutes may also block enforcement of foreign (read U.S.) antitrust judgements
in some circumstances. Id. at 780-82.
1 18. The United Kingdom and Canada both enacted "clawback" statutes, authorizing
citizens of their countries to recover the punitive portion of a foreign multiple damage
award, as in a treble damage suit under U.S. antitrust laws, in an action brought in the courts
of their own countries. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.); Foreign Ex
traterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, § 9 (1984).
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that a firm should not be found in violation of the Sherman Act for
doing what another sovereign required of it.119 Yet it made no attempt
to set forth the principles of comity, principles indicating that a court
should defer to the interests of foreign governments in some circum
stances, that are of major import today.120 It is probably fair to say that
the Committee contemplated conflicts with foreign sovereigns when
extraterritorial jurisdiction was asserted but was somewhat unsure of
how to deal with them.
While conflicts created by American assertions of extraterritorial
j urisdiction intensified through the sixties, seventies, and early eighh
ies, enactment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, the
fuller development of concepts of comity, the early stages of bilateral
cooperation arrangements,121 and the further development of competi
tion policies and antitrust standards in the European Community and
elsewhere all tended to reduce conflicts and to give the United States'
position on extraterritoriality a more moderate cast. The effects test
also gained greater acceptability as other nations perceived that their
nationals were also injured by conduct outside their territory. With the
decision of the European Court of Justice to apply the Treaty of
Rome's competition policy on an extraterritorial basis in a manner
similar to that of the United States,122 the countries of the Community,
followed ultimately by others, have decided that if you cannot fight
them, join them. This in turn created a new set of conflicts, as a num
ber of countries, many of whom have relatively new antitrust legisla
tion, now may be left to assert jurisdiction over conduct that occurred
in none of them but had effects in each.123 Part of the current calls for

119. REPORT, supra note 2, at 83. For the modern version of the sovereign compulsion
defense see INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 1 12, at 3.32.
120. For application of comity principles today, see, in addition to the cases cited supra
note 1 13, Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy Board, 954 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Eskofot AIS v. E.l. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Rivendell Forest Products, Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products, Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 1116 (D.
Colo. 1993).
121. The first bilateral cooperation agreement entered into by the United States was
with Germany. Since entry into that agreement in 1976, the United States has signed anti
trust cooperation agreements with Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Brazil and Mexico. The
texts of all of these agreements may be found in 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. '![13,500 (Jun. 23,
1976).
122. Joined Cases 89, 104, 1 14, 1 16, 1 17, & 125-129/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v.
Comm'n ("Wood Pulp"), 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901.
123. This is particularly true with respect to mergers, where a number of countries now
have merger notification procedures similar to those of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 1 5
U.S.C. § 18a (1994). The number of nations with pre-merger notification procedures has
·risen from about twelve in 1990 to about sixty now. See ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra note
6, at 48. Most of these countries require notification of mergers having effects within their
countries. Just as the United States takes the position that a merger of two foreign firms that
has an adverse effect on the U.S. domestic market, the European Commission has done the
same with respect to its domestic market. See INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS GUIDELINES,
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increased coordination among national enforcement agencies and for
the adoption of some kinds of international competition policy stan
dards are the direct result of this overlapping extraterritoriality.124
The Committee's view of the antitrust world was a more modest
one. As Robert Nitschke observes in his symposium commentary,
there were "few countries other than the United States which [had]
any effective antitrust policies or enforcement programs."125 A number
of countries opposed antitrust in any form, preferring nationalization
and ultimately the destruction of the free market system. Antitrust
was an almost peculiarly American phenomenon and the Committee
so viewed it. In its view, the Sherman Act and Clayton Act were to be
interpreted to provide protection of American domestic import and
export markets from international cartels, recognizing that they would
never be wholly adequate to the task, and to protect and encourage
American investment abroad, both for its own sake and as a means of
increasing productivity in the economics of other nations (in part to
help fend off the spread of communism). Because American antitrust
was virtually unique, there was no talk of cooperation among national
antitrust enforcement agencies or development of international stan
dards and dispute settlement mechanisms. These are among the most
significant matters today. The Committee can hardly be faulted, how
ever, for not envisioning the modern international antitrust world.
The Report's concern over the ability of American firms to invest
and produce abroad is reflected in 1) its criticism of a then common
interpretation of two leading cases that suggested that creation by
American competitors of joint manufacturing facilities abroad would
be unlawful because it would reduce American exports,126 a notion
supra note 112, at § 3.12, Example H; General Electric/Honeywell, Case No. COMP/M.2220,

Jul. 3, 2001. Other countries may be expected to do the same.
124. See Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 301-02. A variety of proposals for international cooperation and har
monization of antitrust standards have been advanced over the past fifteen years. The Euro
pean Union has advocated the adoption of competition standards through the World Trade
Organization, a proposal the United States has opposed. For views of the EU, see Mario
Monti, European Competition for the 21st Century, in 2000 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW
INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 257, 265 (B. Hawk ed., 2001) and
Karel van Miert, European Competition Policy: A Retrospective and Prospects for the Future,
in 1999 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW &
POLICY, 1, 6-8 (B. Hawk ed., 2000). Cf Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: Interna
tional Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, Address Before the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 24th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law
& Policy (Oct. 16, 1997), at http:l/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1233.htm. For a de
tailed discussion of the WTO proposal and a variety of other forms of multilateral coopera
tion and standardization, see Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competi
tion Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478 (2000).
125. Nitschke, supra note 1, at 1070.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 603-04 (1951); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947, 962 (D. Mass. 1950).
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that today we would view as bizarre, 2) its rejection of the intra
enterprise conspiracy in cases involving parents and their wholly
owned subsidiaries127 and 3) its conclusion that joint manufacturing or
distribution undertakings abroad between American and foreign
firms, or American firms alone should be permissible unless American
commerce is restrained. None of these propositions is debatable today,
although they were debatable in 1955. The greater concern for com
panies now may be the legality of these arrangements under the law of
the countries where American firms operate.
A major part of the Report's foreign commerce section is entitled
"Relation of Antitrust to United States Programs Abroad,"128 a discus
sion in which the Committee sets forth little of its own thinking but
quotes extensively from comments made by a number of other gov
ernment agencies in response to an invitation by the Committee. The
Committee itself is reticent, observing that it was not charged with
evaluating foreign programs of other government agencies, that the
relationship between these programs is "delicate" and may involve de
cisions beyond the authority of the enforcement agencies to make. In
the end, it simply calls for advanced discussion about projected anti
trust proceedings with agencies whose foreign programs may be in
volved. Such consultations might provide valuable information the
relevance of which must be determined by the antitrust agencies
themselves. Resolution of inter-departmental conflicts, however, may
be up to the President. The Report treads very carefully here, dealing
with what is still a very contemporary issue, namely the role of gov
ernment policy makers outside the Justice Department in the deci
sionmaking processes of the antitrust enforcement agencies.129
The quoted comments of other agencies are illuminating. The
Department of Commerce, Department of State, and Foreign Opera
tions Administration all expressed concern that uncertainties about
antitrust matters may discourage foreign investment. The Department
of Defense commented on the possible adverse effect of major anti
trust actions involving the foreign operations of large American cor
porations on its programs to serve the national defense. There is a
contemporary ring to these comments. Anyone who has spent time at
the Antitrust Division would expect these same comments from the
same sources today.
The most intriguing comment to today's readers would likely be
the following from the Department of State, suggesting that the poli
cies that led to the adoption of our antitrust laws:

127. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61 .
128. REPORT, supra note 2, at 92-114.
129. For a discussion of these issues, see Thomas E. Kauper, Politics and the Justice De
partment: A View From The Trenches, 9 J.L. & POL. 257 (1993).
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also indicate the desirability of developing some means of international
cooperation in dealing with restrictive practices affecting international
trade. While it is not yet clear what form such cooperation might best
take, progress along these lines is important because other countries,
which are smaller than the United States and more dependent upon in
ternational trade, cannot take effective action in curbing restrictive busi
ness practices unless countries with whom their trade is tied do likewise.
It is also important because no country by itself has j urisdiction to deal
with these practices in their entirety. International cooperation in dealing
with them would avoid frictions and harm to business interests that may
flow from the unilateral action of any single country. 130

In an antitrust world where cooperation among national enforce
ment agencies and harmonization of competition policy standards on
an international basis is the order of the day, this comment has a dis
tinctly contemporary ring. Today there are more than eighty countries
with competition policy legislation and agencies with whom coopera
tion could occur, cooperation made necessary by globalization and
overlapping jurisdiction. In 1955, with only a handful of countries
having and enforcing such legislation, it is not clear what the
Department of State meant by cooperation. The fact that other coun
tries might not alone be able to deal with restrictive business practices
in international trade was the result, at least in part, of the absence of
such legislation. Nevertheless, the call for cooperation surely is an ap
propriate precursor of things to come.
The State Department comments were made shortly after the re
jection by the Congress of the Havana Charter,131 the charter for a new
International Trade Organization ("ITO") that would administer the
GATT. The Havana Charter included competition policy provisions
that could be applied through the ITO's dispute resolution mecha
nism. The State Department's comments may simply be a lament over
the Havana Charter's demise. They may also be a cautious commen
tary on draft articles of a proposed international code on restrictive
business practices promulgated by the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations in 1953.132 The draft code's substantive standards
were patterned on those in the Havana Charter. The code also called
for a central dispute resolution mechanism through which government
to government complaints and recommendations could be made. At
the time the Report was prepared, the United States had taken no po
sition on the proposed code.133 The Committee did likewise, stating
130. REPORT, supra note 2, at 94.
pra

131. For a brief discussion of the birth and death of the Havana Charter, see Wood, su
note 1 24, at 281-85.
132. See id. at 284-85.
133. The Eisenhower administration ultimately opposed the code and the effort was

brought to an end.
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that consideration of international means for dealing with anticom
petitive restraints was beyond the scope of the Report,134 was primarily
an international relations question and called for factual judgments
the Committee could not make. The Committee knew a political hot
potato when it saw one and simply ducked.
While the Committee remained silent on the U.N. proposal, a mi
nority position authored by Eugene Rostow asserted that given the
scope of the international cartel problem, the inability of most coun
tries to deal with them, the scope of the cartels, the lack of antitrust
laws and/or enforcement in most countries, the lack of interest in car
tels of particular interest to the United States, and the fact that, even
with the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Sherman Act
could be applied to but a fraction of the problem, the time had come
to consider a solution based on international cooperation.135 There
followed a detailed analysis of the U.N. draft. Some members felt
obliged to reply, doing so in a separate statement by Gilbert
Montague.136 The debate set forth in these two statements could just as
well have been addressed to current proposals to place competition
standards in the WTO, utilizing its existing dispute settlement proce
dures. Montague makes many of the points critics of the WTO pro
posal make today. The Sherman Act is itself adequate to protect
American interests. The U.N. proposal discriminates against countries
with highly developed antitrust systems and will provoke harassing
complaints by smaller, anticapitalistic nations; those deciding com
plaints are not judges but political representatives; the proposal, if
adopted, could override our domestic law and, in Montague's final
flourish, will imperil the national security of the United States, thereby
performing "a potent service for the Kremlin."137 The Rostow state
ment, much calmer in tone, refutes much of this in terms that could
endear him to present day supporters of current WTO proposals. Per
haps the most contemporary response of all came from Robert
Nitschke in the pages of the Michigan Law Review. Noting that in
1 955 few countries had antitrust laws and that there was a worldwide
lack of consensus about both the desirability and substance of anti
trust, he concludes that proposals like the U.N. draft are premature.
And in language that could have been taken from Clinton Administra
tion statements about the effort to utilize the WTO in competition
policy matters,138 he asserts:

134. REPORT, supra note 2, at 98.
135. Id. at 98-105.
136. Id. at 105-08.
137. REPORT, supra note 2, at 107.
138. Compare these remarks with the following remarks of Joel I. Klein, then the Assis
tant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division:
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Perhaps a better international cartel program, designed to promote
antitrust objectives as well as to eliminate friction regarding extraterrito
rial application, would be step-by-step bilateral agreements with those
nations, such as Canada, which have laws and policies similar to ours.
Such agreements could establish procedures for dealing with restrictive
practices that have an impact in both countries and can be dealt with
satisfactorily by neither alone and could provide experience for further
progress in this field. 139

The international antitrust world has changed dramatically since
1955. Over eighty countries have antitrust laws in one form or another.
There is a growing consensus over substance and over the need for
some form of harmonization of standards and procedures. The past
twenty or so years have been the bilateral agreement stage suggested
by Mr. Nitschke. How and when we will move beyond is at this mo
ment anybody's guess. 140
V.

CONCLUSION

Reading the Report now forty-seven years after its release is in
one sense comforting. It confirms that there is a constancy to the core
of antitrust. Having detoured and experimented with new per se rules
in the sixties and seventies, we have confined the use of such rules to
day to what they were in 1955. The rule of reason governs under sec
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. The general standards under section 2 re
main the same, although in some cases somewhat more precise
standards have developed. Exclusive dealing cases today are decided
much as the Report contemplated. Resale price maintenance is just as
As should be absolutely clear by now, the United States places a very high value on the prac
tical law enforcement value of developing bilateral mutual assistance agreements and other
cooperative efforts among antitrust agencies. I would hate to see our energy and attention
diverted from these practical efforts at improving enforcement, particularly against interna
tional cartels, diminished by an unwieldy and theoretical WTO exercise. Indeed, a prema
ture effort to negotiate rules at the WTO is fraught with risk . . . .
Klein, supra note 124, at 9.
139. Nitschke, supra note 1, at 1071.
140. In its final paragraphs of its foreign commerce section, the Report noted that the
Webb-Pomerene Act, which authorizes, inter alia, export cartels, had been severely criti
cized, but concluded that it was of limited practical significance and should be retained until
there were changes in the pattern of state buying agencies, state monopolies and existing
cartel policies. Eugene Rostow in dissent urged repeal, characterizing the Act as represent
ing "a philosophy antithetic to that of the Sherman Act." REPORT, supra note 2, at 1 14. He
might have added that it is an emba r rassment to U.S. efforts to prosecute foreign cartels and
should have been repealed years earlier. It is however not only still with us, 15 U.S.C. § 61,
66 (1 994), but was supplemented in 1982 by the Expor t Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
4001-4021 (1 994). It has also been emulated by other nations that have exempted export car
tels from competition policy restrictions. See A. Paul Victor, Export Cartels: An Idea Whose
Time Has Passed, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 571 (1992). Export cartel exemptions are of limited
utility, since countries that feel the effects of such cartels may apply their own antitrust stat
utes to them whether they are exempted in their home country or not. See A. Ahlstrom
Osakeyhtio v. Comm'n "Wood Pulp," 1 988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (EU).
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per se illegal as it was in 1955. Vertical nonprice restraints are sub
jected to analysis under the rule of reason. The courts continue to
struggle with "conscious parallelism," much as the Report did. While
it took a number of years, we can now safely conclude that parent cor
porations and their wholly owned subsidiaries are legally incapable of
conspiracy.
The Report met with some legislative successes and some failures.
The most striking failure, however, was the Committee's valiant but
ultimately unsuccessful effort to work major changes in the interpreta
tion or language of the Robinson-Patman Act. As it turned out, the
Report's starting premise - that the Act should and would be harmo
nized with the broader standards of the Sherman Act - has not been
accepted by the courts to any substantial degree. As a result, the
Report's recommended "interpretations" have met with little success
over the years, except as they related to the meeting competition de
fense. Nor has the Robinson-Patman Act seen legislative change. It
has proven to be an implacable foe.
The real measure of change from the Report's date until now is
found not in what it covers, but in what it does not cover. The Report
discusses exemptions for certain activities of railroads, motor carriers
and airlines, exemptions that disappeared with the deregulation
movement; there is not a single word about the state action and Noerr
Pennington doctrines, the frequent subjects of antitrust litigation to
day. Tying arrangements and concerted refusals to deal are treated as
virtual per se violations with little or no analysis; today the law on
both subjects is far more complex. Joint ventures are not discussed at
all. Mergers get scant attention, while today they take a major part of
the enforcement resources of both federal agencies. There were of
course no guidelines, no pre-filing settlements, and no pre-merger no
tification processes. The explanation for all of these omissions and vir
tual omissions is to be found in the absence of decided cases since, af
ter all, the Report rests primarily on cases the Committee had
available. Nor did the Committee try to anticipate future issues that
would arise as the law was pushed further, or as business practices
changed and economic analysis became both more sophisticated and
an integral part of antitrust doctrine.
Also missing is any significant recognition of either criminal en
forcement or the impact of private actions, particularly treble damage
actions. The Report reads as though virtually all antitrust cases were
civil actions initiated by either the Justice Department or the FTC.
This is not so easily explained. By the mid-1950s, criminal prosecution
was hardly a rarity, even though it had not taken on the significance it
has today. The Committee's lack of attention, except for its very weak
penalty recommendation and concerns about grand jury abuse, sug
gests the Committee was simply not enamored of criminal cases at all.
The lack of discussion of private actions is more startling. The Report
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does contain several specific procedural recommendations in connec
tion with what it describes as the "burgeoning" number of private
cases. Beyond that, there is little recognition of the fact that such cases
play a major role in shaping the law, without the participation of the
government enforcement agencies. The federal courts ultimately con
trol the development of antitrust doctrine, primarily in cases in which
the parties may care little about anything but winning or losing.
A number of the Report's recommended "interpretations" seem
directed primarily to the agencies. This is particularly true of its treat
ment of the Robinson-Patman Act, where its proposed treatment of a
number of issues appears to be directed at the FTC. The FTC's en
forcement decisions are important and have helped shape legal analy
sis. But private cases, where agency discretion and deference are not
in play, may have greater impact. This is certainly the case today, as
the FTC initiated only one Robinson-Patman proceeding in the past
twelve years. Private cases, however, have continued at a regular, if
somewhat diminished pace. Nevertheless, the Report seems remarka
bly insensitive to the substantive effect of private litigation. While
"burgeoning," private actions had not taken on the significance that
they have today.
Finally, the Committee's at-the-rear treatment of economic analy
sis and its relevance is both unsatisfying in itself and speaks clearly to
how different the antitrust of today is from that of 1955. The develop
ment of the concept of "workable competition" is not wrong; it cer
tainly is based on many of the factors that are recited in economic
analysis today. The Committee was not sure, however, that it was
relevant to the substance of antitrust. While the role of economic
analysis, data, theory and testimony has continued to be the subject of
debate for the past forty-seven years, there can be no doubt of its pri
macy in both enforcement policy and judicial decisionmaking today. It
shaped the antitrust revolution of the eighties and nineties. And while
debates over Chicago and Post-Chicago continue to provoke commen
tary, and economists differ in a variety of other ways, it would be hard
to deny that antitrust is becoming an economist's world.
Antitrust in 1955 was far simpler than it is today. Fewer cases, no
guidelines, and little economic analysis cluttered things up. But for all
of that, the core of antitrust has worked its way back to that which the
Report describes. If Committee members reviewed the antitrust world
of 2002 they would be pleased, even though if candid they would ad
mit that their Report probably had little to do with it. They sought a
world governed primarily by the rule of reason. And that is where we
are today. Today's rule of reason may be truncated, structured or
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quick look, but it is still the rule of reason.141 And it dominates much
of antitrust analysis today.

141. See California Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1 999);
Thomas E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 893,
905-15 (1987).

